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This research paper focuses on the s424 (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. It is deals 
specifically with the wording of the section and how courts have interpreted it. It critically 
explains the most cherished principles of corporate law as to the interpretation of the section. 
Notwithstanding the existence of s424 (1), in 2011 the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 came 
into force. The new Companies Act also deals with the liability of directors for reckless and 
fraudulent trading. However, the new Companies Act deals with such liability differently 
from s424 (1) of the companies Act of 1973. 
The difference between the s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 and the new Companies 
Act of 2008 can be seen on the application of both Acts.  Section 424 (1) of the Companies 
Act of 1973 applies by the application of creditors at the winding up of the company whereas 
the new Companies Act of 2008 introduces s22 which applies even when the company is still 
continuing to do business. 
Furthermore, s424 (1) of the Companies Act provides remedies to the creditors for the debts 
incurred by the company whereas the new Companies Act introduces s77 (3) provides for 
remedies to the company for any loss, damages, or costs sustained by the company as a direct 
or indirect consequence of the directors’ conduct. 
Accordingly, despite the coming to force of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, s424 (1) of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 still exist in the circumstances of winding up the company. The 
application of both s424 (1) and s22 and s77 (3) has encouraged me to deal with the topic of 
liability of directors for reckless and fraudulent trading. This research paper tries to look at 
both Acts and how they approach the liability of directors in the aforesaid manner. The 
research paper tries to look at what courts have said since the coming into force of the 
Companies Act of 2008 since 2011. 
I wish to deeply pass my gratitude to supervisor Professor RC Williams of University of 
KwaZulu Natal who has helped and guided me in completing this research paper. I also wish 
to thank Professor B Grant and D Subramanien who have also helped me in formulating the 





TABLE OF CONTENTS        PAGE 
1. Introduction          1 
2. Background          2 
3. The provisions of s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973    4 
3.1. The wording of the section        4 
3.2. The purpose of the section        5 
3.3. The relationship between s424 (1) and s77 (3) (b) and s22 of the Companies    
Act of 2008           6 
3.4. The liability requirements        9 
3.4.1. General         9 
3.4.2. Locus Standi         10 
3.4.3. The proof of recklessness, fraudulent, or intent to defraud creditors 13 
3.4.4. The causal link between the conduct of the director and the carrying        
on of the business of the company      15 
4. The wording of s424 (1) of the Act       19 
4.1. When it appears         19 
4.2. Recklessness          20 
4.3. Intent to defraud or fraudulent purpose      25 
4.4. Any person who is knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business of       
the company in the aforesaid manner      28 
4.4.1. Any person         28 
4.4.2. Knowingly         29 
4.4.3. Party to         30 
4.4.4. Debts and other Liabilities       31 
5. A critique of s424 (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and s22 and s77 (3) of the 
Companies 71 Act of 2008        35 
6. Conclusion          48 
7. Bibliography                     40
            
            











This research paper will look at the liability of directors where a company engages in 
fraudulent or reckless trading. In doing so, it will specifically and analytically deal with s424 
(1) of the Companies Act of 1973 and s77 (3) (b) and s22 of the Companies Act of 2008. In 
doing so, it will firstly deal with the background of s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 
and s77 (3) (b) and s22 of the Companies Act of 2008. The background tries to establish the 
reasons for the enactment of s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 and s77 (3) (b) and s22 
of the Companies Act of 2008. In other words the background provides for general 
functioning of the sections so that there is a clear understanding of the reasons why this topic 
was chosen and what developments, if any, have been made by the introducing s77 (3) (b) 
and s22 of the Companies Act of 2008 as opposed to s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973. 
Having said that the background will deal with the general functioning of the sections, it is 
important to deal with the wording of the sections in a detailed manner. Therefore, the 
provisions of the sections need to be discussed for a clear understanding of relationship 
between the sections. Accordingly, this research paper is aimed at providing the relationship, 
requirements, and the purpose of s424 (1) of the Companies Act 1973 and s77 (3) (b) and s22 
of the Companies Act of 2008. Specifically, the research paper tries to deal with the 
requirements for liability under s424 (1) for fraudulent or reckless trading so that it is to 
understand why the courts cases on those requirements. In this regard there will be clear 
understanding on how the law affects the existing facts and what reasoning is given by the 
courts in those particular facts. Accordingly, the research paper focuses on what has been 
held by the courts as general meaning of reckless and fraudulent trading and thereafter 
specific meaning of fraudulent and reckless trading in terms of s424 (1). The research paper 
will then go on to deal the issue of locus standi, whereby the claim is brought in court in 
terms of s424 (1), and how the court have dealt with this issue where there was a ceding of 
rights by the creditors. The reason for discussing this is to have a better understanding to 
what has been held the court and which court had taken a convincing approach as to this 
issue. Thereafter, the research paper will deal with the issue of proving what has been known 
as causal link by the court between the conduct of directors and the carrying of the business 
2 
 
of the company thereby incurring liabilities. The reason for this is the fact that the courts have 
had different approach as to this issue.
1
 
Having discussed all these issues, the research paper will look at the specific wording of s424 
(1) and s22 and 77 (3) (b). Since the coming into force of the Companies Act of 2008, there 
has been a change as to the issue reckless trading and insolvency.
2
  In this instance, it will 
look at what degree of recklessness is required for reckless trading; and when it is said that 
the business of the company was carried with intent to defraud. Thereafter, it will dscuss 
what is meant by “any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business” 
in the aforementioned conduct. Lastly, it will look at the insolvency of the company and what 
has been changed by the Companies of 2008. 
The ending of the research paper will discuss the critique on s424 (1) of the Companies Act 
of 1973 and the existence of s22 and s77 (3) of the Companies Act of 2008 as at 2011 when 
the act was enacted. 
 
2. Background 
 When directors act on behalf of the company, they are not personally liable for the debts and 
liabilities of the company
3
 as obligations vest on the company itself not its members.
4
 It is 
only in exceptional circumstances that the directors of the company will be liable for the 
debts of the company. 
5
 However, the separate legal personality of a company has often been 
abused by the directors of the company. As a result this abuse has been recognized by both 
courts and legislature and has dealt with the issue.
6
  
Section 424 (1) of the Companies Act
7
 was enacted to prohibit the abuse of the separate legal 
personality of the company. This section is still applicable in the course of winding up the 
company, should a creditor make an application, since the court may declare any person, who 
was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business of the company recklessly or 
fraudulently, to be personally liable or responsible for the debts and liabilities of the company 
                                                 
1
 See Saincic & Others v Industro – Clean (Pty) Ltd & Another [2006] JOL 17559 (SCA) as the court took a 
different approach to what has been held by other courts. 
2
 See s22 of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
3
 FHI Cassim…et al Contemporary Company Law 2
nd
 ed (2012) 33. 
4
 RC Williams Concise Corporate Law 2
nd
 ed (1997) 77. 
5
 Cassim Op cit note 3 at 39. 
6
 Ibid at 29. 
7
 61of 1973.  
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when it appears that the business of the company was carried in the aforementioned manner.
8
 
Section 424 (1) is a far reaching provision as it provides that a party to the carrying on of the 
business of the company in the aforesaid conduct is liable without any limitation.
9
 Generally 
what happens is that at the winding up of the company the affairs of the company, and the 
conduct of directors, are investigated.
10
 If it appears that directors were carrying on the 
business of the company recklessly or fraudulently, they are held liable.
11
  
On the other hand, the new Companies Act
12
 was also enacted to prohibit the abuse of the 
separate legal personality of the company and provide a relief where the company has been 
carried in the prohibited aforementioned manner
13
. However, sections 77 (3) (b) and 22 (1) of 
the Companies Act
14
 provide for liability of damages, costs, and any loss of the company on 
the part of directors where there was reckless and fraudulent trading in the business of the 
company.  
However, despite the coming to force of the Companies Act of 2008, s424 (1) of the 
Companies Act of 1973 is still applicable for creditors to render liability for reckless and 
fraudulent trading when the company is being wound up
15
. As a result directors, while trading 
in the course and scope of the company’s business, should be aware of the provisions of the 
old and new Companies Acts as far as personal liability is concerned
16
. Section 424 (1) puts 
directors under light and specifically allow the courts to declare them personally liable for the 
debts of the company where the business of the company was carried on recklessly or 
fraudulently. On the other hand s22 and s77 (3) (b) allow the courts to declare them 
personally liable for damages an costs of the company where the business of the company 
was carried on recklessly or fraudulently. In Ebrahim and Another v Airport Cold Storage 
                                                 
8
 JTR Gibson…et al South African Mercantile & Company Law 8
th
 ed (2005) 352. 
9
 R Naidoo Corporate Governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2009) 180. 
10




 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
13




 Section 424 (1) provides that ‘when it appears, whether it be in a winding-up, judicial management or 
otherwise, that any business of the company was or is being carried on recklessly or with intent to defraud 
creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the 
application of the Master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, any creditor, or member or contributory of the 
company, declare that any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the manner 
aforesaid shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for or all or any of the debts or 
other liabilities of the company as the Court may direct’. 
16





 using s 64(1) of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984
18
 the court held that those 
who are running the corporation may not use its formal identity to incur liabilities recklessly, 
gross negligently, or fraudulently because if they do, they risk being made personally liable. 
Accordingly, s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 and s77 (3) (b) and s22 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 are relevant when dealing with the liabilities of directors for reckless 
and fraudulent trading. 
 
3. The provisions of s424(1) of the Companies Act 
3.1. The wording of the section 
Section 424 (1)
19
 provides that:  
‘when it appears, whether it be in a winding-up, judicial management or otherwise, that any business of the 
company was or is being carried on recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors 
of any other person or for any fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the application of the Master, the 
liquidator, the judicial manager, any creditor, or member or contributory of the company, declare that any 
person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the manner aforesaid shall be 
personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for or all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the 
company as the Court may direct’. 
In other words the court may only grant relief:
20
 
 when it appears that any business of the company was or is being carried on 
recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other 
person or for any fraudulent purpose; and 
 in respect of any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of business 




                                                 
17
 2008 (6) SA 585 (SCA) at para 15. 
18
 This Act applies the same as s424 (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
19
 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
20
 See also Pressma Services (Pty) Ltd v Schuttler and Another 1990 (2) SA 411 (C) at 416 where Van Schalkwyk 
AJ took the same view and held that ‘the person, in respect of whom the relief is granted, is declared to be 




3.2. The purpose of section 
The purpose and intention of s424 (1) has been interpreted by the courts. Seemingly, the 
courts agree as to the purpose and intention of s424 (1). In Pressma Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Schuttler and Another
21
 Van Schalkwyk AJ held ‘The clear purpose of s 424(1) is to render 
personally liable all persons who knowingly participate in the fraudulent or reckless conduct 
of the business of a company’. In Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v JR Snyman & Others 
22
 
Howie JA held that ‘the legislative intention in enacting s 424 was to broaden the scope of 
the earlier provision and to extend the remedy by means of which a restraining influence can 
be exercised on over-sanguine directors’. Howie JA interpreted s424 as to broaden the scope 
of liability and to provide for unlimited liability for debts and liabilities against any person 
who carries the business of the company recklessly or fraudulently.
23
  
Writers have also agreed with this purpose of s424 (1). Achada,
24
 for instance, makes the 
point that the intention of s424 (1) is protect creditors and prevent fraudulent and reckless 
trading of directors of the company as ‘it was enacted to provide a remedy against fraudulent 
and/or reckless behaviour by directors’. Sigwadi
25
 points out that the purpose of s424 (1) has 
two folds namely that it exists to render all those who are knowingly party to the carrying of 
business of the company recklessly or fraudulently personally liable for the debts or wrongful 
conduct; and to benefit creditors a ‘meaningful remedy against fraudulent and reckless 
trading’. Sigwadi further argues that second purpose may not be achieved if the creditors 
right to institute action under s424 (1) is compromised.
26
 This is supported by Achada as he 
argues if s424 (1) is compromised, then this means that s424 (1) is worthless and fraud and 




1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) at page 143. 
23
 See also Pressma Services (Pty) Ltd v Schuttler and Another Op cit note 15 at 416 where Van Schalkwyk AJ 
held ‘the corollary of this purpose is to provide a meaningful remedy against the abuses at which the 
subsection is directed and it is, in my view, unthinkable that the Legislature could have intended that the 
aforestated purpose could be frustrated…’ 
24
 T Achada ‘Directors’ liabilities for Company debts: another recent decision’ (2003) 10 (4) Juta’s Business Law 
199 
25
 M Sigwadi ‘Compromise and personal liability of directors under s424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973’ 
(2003) 15 (3) South African Mercantile Law Journal 388-389. He further argues that if s424 (1) is compromised, 
it thus means that s424 (1) is worthless and fraud and reckless, by dishonest directors of a company, is 
encouraged. See also Triptomia Twee (Pty) Ltd & Others v Connolly & Another 2003 (4) SA 558 (C) at page 562 
where the court held that the two phrases which are require to do the work if s424 (1) is to be applied are 
‘knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the fraudulent manner; and carried on recklessly with 









 points out that 
this section empowers the court to impose liability to any person who was knowingly a party 
to the carrying on of business of company and such liability is imposed without any 
limitation for all or any debts or liabilities of the company. 
 
3.3. The relationship between s424 and s77 (3) and s22 of the Companies Act of 2008 
Section 77 (3) (b)
29
 of the Act provides that a director of the company will be liable for any 
loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of the 
director having acquiesced in carrying on of the company’s business, despite knowing that it 
was being conducted in a manner prohibited by s 22 (1) of the Act.
30
 This section provides 
the court with the powers as s 424 (1)
31
 of the 1973 Act as s 424 (1) empowers the court to 
have a discretion to hold anyone liable in respect liability of directors depending on the 
circumstances of the case.
32
 Therefore, one has to consider s 424 (1) in dealing with liability 
of directors as “our courts are prepared to use this section as an effective measure to control 
directors’ actions”.
33
 The interpretation and application of both s77 (3) of the Companies Act 
of 2008 and s424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 are similar in that they have the elements 
that are required to prove liability. Under s424 (1) director must knowingly be a party to the 
carrying on the business of the company recklessly or fraudulently and secondly, the business 
of the company must be carried on recklessly or in a fraudulent manner. On the other hand, 
s77 (3) (b) apply ‘to render liable all persons, not only directors, who knowingly participate 
or acquiesce in the fraudulent or reckless conduct of the company’s business’.
34
 In this 
instance, it may be arguably said that these sections have the same required elements as they 
render liable, even though not the same persons since s424 (1) provides liability to the 
creditors of the company whereas s77 (3) (b) provides liability of to the company, any party 
who was knowingly a party or participated in the carrying of business of the company 
                                                 
27
 Op cit 19 at page 395. 
28
 J.S. McLennan ‘The Liability of Agents for Debts Contracted on Behalf of Insolvent Companies’ (1995) 7 (1) 
South African Mercantile Law Journal 69. 
29
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
30
 Ibid. This section provides that a company must not carry on its business recklessly, with gross negligence, 
with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose. 
31
 Companies Act 61of 1973. 
32
Op cit note 15. 
33
 M Havenga  ‘Director’s Personal Liability for Reckless Trading’ (1998) 61 (4) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 719. 
34
 Cassim Op cit note 3 at 588 . 
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recklessly or fraudulently. Both these sections apply to provide a meaningful remedies for the 
abuses at which they are directed
35
. 
However, the fact that s77 (3), s22, and s424 (1) are to be read in conjunction with each are, 
they are not necessarily the same. These sections may seem to appear as the same since they 
deal with recklessness, fraudulent purpose, and intent to defraud, but they are not necessarily 
the same in a manner that they are enforced.
36
 However, the wording of the sections is not the 
same in a manner that some of the words do appear in one section while they do not in the 
other section. Under s22, the Commission prohibits the reckless and fraudulent carrying on of 
the business of the company
37
 whereas under s424 (1) it is the court which prohibits reckless 
and fraudulent trading.
38
 In this instance, it is quite clear that the prohibition of reckless and 
fraudulent trading under s424 (1) becomes an issue and is dealt with at the winding up of the 
company whereas under s22 the issue is dealt with when the company is still trading. This 
creates the issue of factual and commercial insolvency.
39
 Furthermore, it is indeed true that 
both s22 and s424 (1) render any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the 
business of the company recklessly or fraudulently. However, the persons who make such 
findings are not the same.
40
 Under s22 the Commission makes such findings whereas under 
s424 (1) the court makes such findings.
41
 The Commission is a juristic person which 
functions as an organ of the state within public administration and it performs it functions 
without fear, favour, or prejudice
42
. Clearly this shows that one is to look closely as to who 
has a jurisdiction to make findings as reckless and fraudulent trading under both Companies 
Act of 1973 and Companies Act of 2008. As result it may be arguably said that the new 
Companies Act has come with changes as to the person who should make findings. Under the 
2008 Companies Act the issue of recklessness and fraud is dealt with by the Commissioner 
before it is taken to court. Therefore, one needs to have this in mind since the court may 
throw out the case if the issue is raised under the Companies Act of 2008 and the procedure 
under 2008 has not been complied with.   




 P Delport (ed) Henochberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2012) 100. 
37
 Section 22 (2) provides that ‘if the commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the company is 
engaging in conduct prohibited by subsection 1, or is unable to pay its debts as they become due and payable 
in the normal course of business, the Commission may issue a notice to the company to show why the 
company should be permitted to continue carrying on its business, or to trade, as the case may be’  
38
 Op cit note 15. 
39
 This is the issue which the research paper is going to deal with at a later stage of this research. 
40
 Delport Op cit note 36. 
41
 See the wording of s22 (2) and wording of s424 (1). 
42
 See s185 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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Section 77 (3) (b), on the other hand, protects the company against any loss, damages or costs 
sustained by the company as a result of the director's conduct in carrying on of the business 
of the company recklessly or fraudulently. On the other hand, s424 (1) protects creditors from 
director’s conduct in carrying on of business reckless or with an intention to defraud 
creditors.
43
 It should be noted that s77 (3) (b) deals with the claim by the company for any 
reckless or fraudulently by the directors of the company. Therefore, if s77 (3) is interpreted in 
its sense, it can be said that its focus is on the protection of the company and not the 
creditors.
44
 As a result, s424 (1) still plays a vital role as it protects the creditors of the 
company. If there is no s424 (1) it may be hard for creditors to claim for their debts as s77 (3) 
(b) has a loophole of focusing only on the protection of the company against reckless or 
fraudulent trading. Furthermore, s424 (1) partially benefits the company itself. In Ex Parte 
Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd
45
 Stegmann J held: 
‘It would appear that a declaration under s 424(1) is also intended to be for the benefit of the company itself in 
various ways. Naturally, if the claimant should choose to recover from the declared wrongdoer, and to forgo 
his claim against the company, the company would indirectly have derived a benefit from the declaration. 
Further, more direct, benefits for the company may also have been intended. For example, if the claimant 
should pursue his remedy against the company alone, the declaration of personal responsibility, without any 
limitation of liability on the part of the declared wrongdoers, may well have been intended by the Legislature 
to enable the company to enjoy at least such rights of contribution from the declared wrongdoers as may exist 
between persons who are jointly liable. It may even have been intended to entitle the company to a complete 
indemnity from the declared wrongdoers, at least in an appropriate case’. 
Moreover, s424 (1) is still important as to the claim against reckless and fraudulent trading. 
Section 424 (1) declares that ‘any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the 
business in the manner aforesaid shall be personally responsible, without any limitation of 
liability, for or all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the Court may 
direct’
46
. In this instance, the liable person is liable “without any limitation” for any debts and 
other liabilities of the company. On the other hand, s77 (3) (b) provides that a person is liable 
for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company.  Accordingly, in s77 (3) (b) there is 
no “without any limitation” in its wording. It appears to be a problem as to which section is 
wider so as to include a coherent mechanism. 
                                                 
43
 In its sense, s424 (1) deals with the liability to creditors of the company. 
44
 In its sense, s77 (3) (b) deals with the liabilities to the company itself and not to the creditors of the 
company.  
45
 1989 (3) SA 71 (T) at page 110. 
46
 Op cit note 19. 
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One may argue that the new Companies Act is wide as to the inclusion of damages in its 
wording.
47
 It is indeed true that, s77 (3) (b) introduces an increased exposure on directors to 
be personal liability where the business of the company is recklessly or fraudulently 
conducted.  This section
48
 introduces the claim for damages sustained by the company as a 
result of the directors’ conduct in carrying on of the business of the company recklessly or 
fraudulently. In this sense, directors are easily exposed to the company’s liabilities and costs 
for the company to claim. However, even this is the case, the creditors do not enjoy the 
benefit of s 77 (3) (b) as the section protects the company against reckless and fraudulent 
carrying on of its business by the directors.  As a result both sections are applicable but they 
provide mechanisms for different persons. 
 
3.4. The liability requirements 
3.4.1 General 
Section 424 (1) in its basic and general sense requires that: 
 any business of the company must have been or is being carried recklessly or for 
fraudulent purpose; or 
 any other person was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the 
manner aforesaid; and 
 the company must have incurred debts and liabilities. 
Directors may incur personal liabilities by reason of the role that they play in governing the 
company. It is true that the company is a separate legal entity with its own liabilities but 
proceedings may also be institute against directors and ‘the most commonly encountered 
basis for liability is that a director or any other person took part in, allowed, or authorized 
specific conduct of the company’.
49
 In this instance, the directors are generally liable in 
accordance with the above general requirements.   
                                                 
47
 Cassim Op cit note 3 at 588 as he argues that s22 of the new Companies Act applies even if the company is 
still an on-going business irrespective of whether or not the company is wound up or not. Therefore, as a 
result of this, s22 is not confined to a winding up of the company. 
48
 Section 77 (3) (b) of Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
49
 K Van der Linde ‘The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Fault – An Exploration’ (2008) 20 (4) South 




However, in its specific sense, s424 (1) is to be interpreted as including the carrying of 
business of the company: 
 recklessly; 
 with the intent to defraud the creditors of the company; 
 with the intent to defraud creditors or any other purpose; and 
 for any other fraudulent purpose.50 
In this instance, these categories include reckless and fraudulent trading in carrying on of the 
business of the company. As a result if any of these categories apply, a creditor may claim 
against the directors of the company in terms of s424 (1).
51
 Accordingly, creditors obtain 
locus standi to approach the court in terms of s424 (1). 
3.4.2. Locus Standi 
The creditor has a locus standi in court for a claim under s424 (1).
52
 It does not matter that 
other creditors, where there are more than one creditor, have not applied in terms of s424 (1) 
but s424 (1) will automatically benefit such creditor.
53
 As soon as it appears that business of 
the company is or was being carried on recklessly, with gross negligence or with intent to 
defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose, the creditor can enforce the remedy against 
                                                 
50 Terblanche No & Others v Damji & Another 2003 (5) SA 489 (C) at page 510 Knoll J held: ‘in order for this            
court to exercise discretion to visit the respondent with personal liability for the company's debts the relevant 
portions of s 424(1) require the applicants to establish that: 
                  (a)   any business of the company, which may refer to any one transaction, was carried on  
                          (b)   (i)   recklessly; or 
                         (ii)   with intent to defraud creditors 
                                         (aa)   of the company; or 
                                         (bb)   of any other person; or 
                          (iii)   with any fraudulent purpose; and  
                  (c) by any person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of business in the manner aforesaid’. See also 
Cooper & Others NNO v Mutual Life Assurance Society & Others 2001 (1) SA 967 (SCA) at para 14B-D where the 
court took the same view.  
51
 In Burley Appliances v Grobelaar No & Others 2004 (1) SA 602 (C) at page 610 the court held that s64 of the 
Close Corporation Act, which applies the same as s424 (1), created statutory rights and corresponding 
liabilities when the business of the Close Corporation is carried out recklessly or with gross negligence or with 
the intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose.  
52 The section provides that ‘the Court may, on the application of the Master, the liquidator, the judicial 
manager, any creditor, or member or contributory of the company, declare that any person who was 
knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in the manner aforesaid shall be personally responsible, 




 Terblanche No & Others v Damji & Another Op cit note 44 at page 515. See also Bowman NO v Sacks & 
Others 1986 (4) SA 459 (W) at page 516 where the court held that persons who are regarded as possible 
applicants under s424 (1) are those with a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter in question. 
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a director or any other person conducting or has conducted a business of the company in the 
aforesaid conduct. In Burley Appliances v Grobelaar
54
 Nel J held: 
‘In my view as soon as it 'appears that any business of the corporation was or is being carried on recklessly, 
with gross negligence or with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose' and the corporation 
has debts or other liabilities, a creditor can enforce the remedy which was created by s 64. The remedy is the 
right to apply to a Court for a declaration that a particular person or particular persons should be held 
personally liable for all or any of such debts or liabilities as the Court may direct’. 
 
Accordingly, the creditor is protected by s424 (1) to have locus standi as the aim of the Act is 
to protect creditors against the possible prejudice created by reckless, gross negligence or 




However, for many years there had been a large disagreement and criticism of judgments 
amongst the courts’ decisions as to who has a right to claim where creditors have 
compromised their rights. In Pressma Services (Pty) Ltd v Schuttler and Another
56
 Van 
Schalkwyk AJ in his judgment held that: 
‘The words “creditors of the company” refer to the existing creditors and former creditors. As a result, even if s 
311 of Companies Act 61 of 1973 applies, the former creditors may also have a claim under s424. These words 
could mean either a person who is creditor of a company at the time when he approaches the court in terms 
of s424 (1) in the sense that there is an existing indebtedness which ceased to exist upon the sanctioning and 
implementation of the compromise. The first, more restricted meaning, is the more obvious and ordinary one 
which, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, would be the meaning to be ascribed to the words. The 
second, extended meaning would be permissible only upon the basis it is consistent with the true intention of 
the Legislature while the first, more restricted meaning, is not. The true intention of the Legislature in this 
regard must, in my view, be determined with reference to the primary objects of s 424(1).  These, as I have 
mentioned, are twofold. The first is to render personally liable all personally liable all the persons who 
knowingly participate in the fraudulent or reckless conduct of the business of a company. The second is to 
provide a meaningful remedy against the abuse at which the subsection is directed. The first of these objects 
would be attained if, upon sanctioning and implementation of a compromise, the personal liability of the 
persons concerned was maintained. This would be the case even if the rights conferred on a creditor by s424 
(1) were to pass to the offeror upon the sanctioning and implementation of the compromise. The second 
object, however, would in my view not be attained if the remedy provided by the subsection were to be lost to 
                                                 
54
 Op cit note 44 at page 614. 
55
 L & P Plant Hire BK en Andere v Bosch en Andere 2002 (2) SA 662 (SCA) at page 39. 
56
 Op cit note 23 at page 417 B-H. 
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the creditors for, in the final analysis, it is to them to them that the debts of the company in respect of which 
personal liability is created by the subsection are  owed’. 
The judgment by Van Schalkwyk AJ was based on the reasoning that both existing and 
former creditors have claim in terms of s424 (1). The court’s interpretation of s424 (1) meant 
that it does not matter that former creditors have compromised their rights. As long as there 
was existing liability of the company, prior to the compromise, former creditors may also 
claim. However, this decision received a lot of criticism by other courts. In Ex Parte De 
Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Development (Pty) Ltd
57
 the court criticized Van 
Schalkwyk AJ. In his judgment Stegman J held: 
‘this is, I must respectfully observe, a curious choice to have postulated, for if the creditors contemplated by 
s424 (1) are to be understood as including not only existing creditors but also former who had disposed of 
their claims to existing creditors in terms of a compromise. The Legislature would have created an unlikely 
situation in which the company’s debt, or some of them, would have to be paid twice over: once to the 
existing creditor and one to the former creditor. Such a result would be an absurdity which the Legislature 
could not have contemplated, and I have no doubt that the implication was not brought to the attention of 
Van Schalkwyk AJ, and certainly not intended by him’.
58
 
According to the court Van Schalkwyk AJ ‘appears to have postulated an ambiguity in s 
424(1), suggesting that “creditor” may have been confined to existing creditors, or may have 
been extended to include former creditors who had ceased to be creditors by virtue of a 
compromise in terms of s 311’.
59
 This issue was also to be decided on appeal but the appeal 
court did not deal with the issue and left an open question as to whether the former creditors 
may claim in terms of s424 (1).
60
 
The issue of compromise has recently been dealt with and solved by the court in Freidlein 
(Pty) Ltd v Simaan & Others
61
 where the court confirmed the decision of the court a quo in 
Ex Parte De Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Development (Pty) Ltd. In her 
judgment Kathree-Setiloane J held: 
                                                 
57
 1992 (2) SA 95 (W). 
58
 Ibid at page 106 B-D. 
59
 Ibid at page 106 A-B. 
60
 See Ex Parte De Villiers & Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 493 (A) where 
Goldstone JA held: ‘In the view I take in this matter, it is not necessary to decide this interesting and difficult 
question. I shall assume that the effect of compromise, on sanction by the court, would be to preclude relief 
under s424 (1) at the instance of the creditor.  
61
 [2012] ZAGPJHC 16. 
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‘having considered the judgment of Stegman J in Ex Parte De Villiers, I am unable to find that either his 
conclusion or reasoning is wrong. I therefore endorse his judgment in all respects in relation to the question of 
whether creditors can both surrender their claims against the company in an offer of compromise and retain 
any rights they may have against its representatives under s424 (1) of the Companies. I am thus of the view 
that the judgment of Van Schalkwyk AJ is clearly wrong as it fails to have regard the following essential factors: 
(a) the freedom conferred upon creditors in an offer of compromise between a company and the 
creditors, in terms of s311 of the Companies Act, to agree to deal with their rights as they see fit by 
agreeing to either compromise, alienate or extinguish their rights; 
(b) for s424 (1) of the Companies Act to be of application, the company must have debts and liabilities.’
62
 
From this judgment it is clear that the former creditor does not have claim under s424 (1) of 
the Companies Act. This makes logic as it prevents the company from being sued twice for 
the same acts of the same debts. If one accepts that the previous creditors are to claim, it 
means that they benefit twice. They benefit in ceding their claims to current creditors and 
benefit from the debtor at the time they invoke s424 (1). Accordingly, if this is the case there 
would not be anyone may want to trade for the company because everybody will know that if 
it happens that the company becomes wound up, he may be sued twice if the creditors have 
ceded their rights to each other. This may also create injustice because some directors may 
make profit by ceding their rights to each other concurrently knowing that they will claim in 
either debtor. The position remains the same that where creditors have agreed to compromise 
their rights, in terms of s311 of Companies Act, s424 (1) may not apply as these creditors are 
not existing creditors. The position is that if the creditors are deemed to have ceded their 
rights to claim against the company, any of those rights, in terms of s424, are extinguished 
upon the sanctioning and implementation of an offer of compromise.
63
 
3.4.3. The proof of recklessness, fraudulent or intent to defraud creditors  
The underlying principle is that directors of the company owe a fiduciary duty to exercise 
their powers bona fide in the best interest of the company
64
. If they fail to act bona fide, and 
                                                 
62
 Ibid at para 15. See also Ex Parte De Villiers & Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd Op cit note 
42 at page 106 where Stegman J held: ‘There is no reason to doubt that, in making provision in s 311 for a 
compromise between a company and its creditors, the Legislature intended to leave the creditors free to agree 
to deal with their rights as they saw fit, i.e to agree to compromise their rights, to alienate them, or to 
extinguish them, as they chose. There is nothing in s 424(1), or its context, which abridges a creditor's freedom 
to agree in terms of s 311 to compromise any rights he may derive from s 424(1), or to alienate such rights, or 
to extinguish them’.  
63
 Ibid at para 21. 
64
 J.S. McLennan ‘Reckless or Fraudulent Conduct of Corporate Business’ (1998) 115 (4) SALJ 597. 
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the creditors suffer, such creditors may claim against the directors in terms of s424 (1)
65
. 
However, writers have concluded that the plaintiff, a person who has made the application to 





 points out that to hold a person liable under s424 (1) of the Companies 
Act, the applicant is to prove on balance of probabilities that the company’s business was 
carried on recklessly or with an intent to defraud creditors. Sigwadi’s point confirms what 
had been pointed out by Williams
68
 as the learned author points out that when the court 
declares a person liable in terms of s424 (1) of the Companies Act, ‘the court must be 
satisfied on balance of probabilities that the creditor’s claim exists and that is quantified by 
acceptable evidence’.   
Courts have taken the same view as to the onus of proof. Courts have accepted the view that 
the plaintiff has to prove on balance of probabilities that the company was or is carried on 
recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors. In Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & 
Others
69
 Howie J took the view that: 
‘the legislative intention in enacting s 424 was to broaden the scope of the earlier provision and to extend the 
remedy by means of which a restraining influence can be exercised on “over-sanguine directors”… The onus is 
upon the party alleging recklessness to prove it and, these being civil proceedings, to establish the necessary 
facts according to the required standard, which is on a balance of probabilities’. 
This point was also emphasized by the court in Strut Ahead Natal v Burns
70
 where the court 
held that in circumstances where the plaintiff has a claim against the defendant for personal 
liability for all debts and liabilities, in terms of s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973, one 
requisite to be met is that the plaintiff bears the onus to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that the defendant was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business of the company 
recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the company. This was also confirmed by the 
court in Terblanche No & Others v Damji & Another
71
 where the court held that the onus lies 
on the applicant to establish the necessary facts on balance of probabilities. This was further 
                                                 
65
 Op cit note 23. 
66
 See McLennan Op cit note 58 as he argues that ‘the plaintiff has the onus of proving that the defendant had 
knowingly been a party to the fraudulent and reckless carrying on of the business of the close corporation’. 
67
 M Sigwadi ‘Personal Liability for the Debts of Close Corporation’ (2003) 15 (2) South African Mercantile Law 
Journal 303. 
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International and Comparative Law Quartely 686. 
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 Op cit note 22 at page 142. 
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 2007 (4) SA 600 (D) at page 607F. 
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 Op cit note 50 at page 510. 
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confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Heneways Freight Services v Groggor
72
 where 
Zulman JA held: 
‘the section penalises fraud or recklessness on the part of anyone who carries on or manages the business of a 
company with intent to defraud creditors of the company... it is necessary to consider whether the appellant 
proved, on a balance of probabilities, that he had no reason for thinking that there would be funds available to 
pay the cheques on their due dates… this is plainly relevant both to the question of fraud and recklessness’.  
The learned judges and academics take this reasoning following the fact that one who alleges 
must prove on balance of probabilities in civil cases. Since a creditor is the one who alleges 
that the defendant had acted recklessly or conducted the business of the company with intent 
to defraud creditors, the creditor bears the onus of proof. If the creditor fails to prove on 
balance of probabilities, then such creditor may not successfully claim under s424 (1) of the 
Companies Act of 1973.
73
     
3.4.4. The causal link between the conduct of the director and the carrying on of 
the business of the company 
The arising issue amongst our courts is whether the plaintiff should prove a causal link 
between the relevant conduct and debts and liabilities of the company. For many years, it was 





 took the view that the plaintiff can successfully claim under s424 (1) 
without a proof of causal link between the relevant conduct and liabilities and debts of the 
company. The reason for this is the fact that our courts have interpreted s424 at the end of the 
company’s existence as this section is applied at the winding up of the company. In other 
words, creditor was not obliged to prove that there was a causal link between the relevant acts 
and the consequences resulted to the liabilities of the company. For example, Achada
76
 
argues that s424 (1) relieves the applicant from proving a causal link between the conduct 
that amounts to fraud in carrying on the business of the company and the debts in which the 
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Juta’s Business Law 199.  
75
 See for example Joh – Air (Pty) Ltd v Rudman 1980 (2) 420 (T) at page 426D or  Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v 
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director or company may be liable. Furthermore, our courts have submitted that the 
provisions of s 424(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 enable the Court to declare such 
director liable ‘for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company’ without any 
proof of the causal connection between the fraudulent conduct of the business of the company 
and the debts or liabilities for which he may be declared liable In Howard v Herrigel & 
Another NNO
77
 Goldstone JA in his judgment held: 
‘At common law a director of a company who is knowingly a party to fraud on the part of his company would 
be liable in damages for any loss suffered by any person in consequence of the fraud. It would be necessary, in 
order to fix the liability of such a director, to establish a causal connection between the fraud of the company 
and the damages claimed from the director. The quantum of the damages would also have to be proved. The 
provisions of s 424(1) of the Act enable the Court to declare such a director liable 'for all or any of the debts 
or other liabilities of the company' without proof of a causal connection between the fraudulent conduct of 
the business of the company and the debts or liabilities for which he may be declared liable’. 
This point was also followed and stressed by the court in Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v 
Snyman & Others
78
 where Howie JA held: 
‘Obviously, therefore, the legislative intention in enacting s 424 was to broaden the scope of the earlier 
provision and to extend the remedy by means of which a restraining influence can be exercised on ‘over-
sanguine directors’. That, of course, does not mean that recklessness is lightly to be found. The remedy is a 
punitive one; a director can be held personally liable for liabilities of the company without proof of any causal 
link between his conduct and those liabilities. 
This point was later confirmed also in Nisbet & Others v Kalinko
79
 where Claassen J held: 
‘It has been held that this section supplements and does not replace remedies which may be available at 
common law to any person... The section also enables the Court to impose a liability on a person where at 
common law such liability might not exist at all. The section comes to the aid of a claimant in circumstances 
where a claim under the common law may be difficult to prove. In particular it relieves the claimant of proof of 
any causal connection between the fraudulent or reckless conduct of the business of the company and the 
debts or liabilities for which the wrongdoer may be declared liable’ 
This position was later followed by the court in Nel & Others NNO v McArthur & Others
80
 
where the court held that there is no causal link that is required, in terms of s424 (1), between 
the reckless conduct in which defendants are alleged to have knowingly participated and the 
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debts or other liabilities for which they may be liable. Plaintiff only needs to prove that 
defendant was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business with fraudulent intent or 
fraudulent purpose.
81
   
However, in 2006 the position was changed by the court. Until 2006, it was clear that claims, 
in terms section 424(1), did not require the proof of causal link between the conduct of 
directors and debts and liabilities of the company. It was not necessary for a claimant to 
prove a causal link between the reckless or fraudulent conduct of a director and the quantum 
of its claim. The case of Saincic & Others v Industro – Clean (Pty) Ltd & Another
82
 changed 
the existing law. According to this case a causal link is a factor to be taken into account when 
applying for a claim under s424 (1). Endorsing dictum in L & P Plant Hire BK en Andere v 
Bosch en Andere
83
 Farlam JA held: 
‘It is true that it is not necessary to prove a causal link between the relevant conduct and the debts or liabilities 
for which there is a declaration of personal liability in terms of section 424. But the absence of such a proven 
link is a factor to be taken into consideration by the court in the exercise of its discretion and in order to decide 
whether such a declaration is, in all the circumstances, just and equitable’
84
. 
It is from these judgments that the question arises as to whether s424 (1) is still an existing 
remedy for creditors. Seemingly, courts such as that in Saincic case are trying to apply s424 
(1) in line with the new Companies Act. The reason for this is that for a long time s424 (1) 
has been regarded as punitive remedy. After the judgment of Saincic the position is not clear 
as to whether the court nullified the punitive remedy that has been regarded as important in 
earlier decision. After the judgment of Saincic the creditors are put in a much stricter onus of 
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18 
 
proving their claim. It is more difficult for creditors to render directors personally liable for 
the debts and liabilities of the company, under s424 (1), where the business of the company 
has been carried on recklessly or fraudulently. Section 424 (1) does not have anything to do 
with quantum of damages. However, Farlam JA in his judgment held: 
‘Although I am of the view that the section is wide enough to cover a declaration of personal liability for debts 
incurred after the period when the offending conduct took place and that such an order would not be 
inappropriate where the new debts take the place, as it were, of old debts incurred during the period because 
the balance owing on the running account does not decrease, I am still unable to say that it is just and 
equitable that the declaration sought should be made’
85
. 
In this reasoning of the court, the court clearly used s424 (1) but s424 (1) does not include the 
quantum of damages in its wording. The idea which may be adopted here is the fact that the 
court was trying to shape what should be done when applying s424 (1). It may argued that, 
because the new Companies Act focuses on claim by the company itself to the directors, s424 
(1) is going to be interpreted in lines of the new Companies Act because the new Companies 
Act does not deal with the claim of creditors. However, this is difficult for creditors as it 
means that the creditor should bear in mind that before instituting claim against the directors 
of the company, such creditor should secure an evidence of the causal link between the 
relevant conduct and the debts and liabilities of the company.
86
 Furthermore, the creditor 
should prove the quantum of damages before the court. Failure to do so will render such 
creditor to be liable for the costs to be incurred by it in the action. 
However, the factor of the causal link has had contradictions after the decision of Saincic 
case. In Strut Ahead Natal v Burns
87
 the court held that the remedy is a punitive one as 
directors may be held personally liable for any debts or liabilities of the company without 
proof of any causal link between their conduct and liabilities of the company. It is indeed true 
that the court in Saincic endorsed the dictum in L & P Plant Hire BK en Andere v Bosch en 
Andere. However, Brand JA has recently explained what he meant in L & P Plant Hire. 
According to Brand JA what he meant was that where a company was able to pay its debts, a 
causal link needs to be proved but if the company is hopelessly insolvent, then no causal link 
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needs to be proved.
88
 In this instance, it may be argued that where a company is hopelessly 
insolvent, there is no need to prove a causal link. In that case creditors are protected where 
the company is hopelessly insolvent as they are not required to prove causal link
89
. 
Accordingly, the time of insolvency of the company and the relevant of the conduct of the 
directors is relevant as that is where it can be said that the conduct of directors towards the 
creditors was around the insolvency of the company.
90
 As for the present date, the position of 
Brand JA in Fourie case remains which means that the only time when the creditor will be 
required to prove a causal link is where the company is able to pay its debts. One may argue 
that this is the situation which draws the attention of the application of the new Companies 
Act as it deals with circumstances where the company is able to pay its liabilities as opposed 
to the circumstances where the company is factual insolvent. Factual insolvent can be said to 
be circumstances whereby the company is hopelessly insolvent which result to the company 
being wound up. 
 
4. The wording of s424 (1) of the Act 
4.1. When it appears 
These words, as contemplated in the Act, do not mean that the court is to decide the case on a 
prima facie case, but the applicant must prove on balance of probabilities.
91
 Furthermore, 
these words should not be ‘interpreted in such a way as to exclude a single reckless or 
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 See Cheng-Li Tsung & Another v Industrial Development of South Africa Ltd & Another [2013] ZASCA 26 at 
para 27 where Lewis JA held ‘it  seems to me to hold more than that there must be some link or connection in 
time between the conduct complained of and the company’s inability to pay. 
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fraudulent transaction from the ambit of the section’.
92
 As a result, a single act by the director 
is enough to render him personally liable for debts and liabilities of the company under s424 
(1). It does not matter whether the act of recklessness or fraud was committed once, by those 
who are responsible for carrying out the business of the company, as long as there is relevant 




Recklessness is not whether the judgment of the defendant was in error, but is more of a 
disregard to the consequences of one’s action or conduct
94
. The test for such recklessness is 
partly objective and partly subjective. It is partly objective ‘to the extent that the defendant’s 
actions are measured against the standard of reasonable man’.
95
 The definition of 
“recklessness’ was firstly defined by Stegmann J in Ex Parte Lebowa Development 
Corporation Ltd
96
 as follows: 
‘In s 424 the term 'recklessly' is used in contradistinction to the term 'fraudulently'. In that context 'recklessly' 
implies the existence of an objective standard of care that would be observed by the reasonable man in 
conducting the business of the company concerned in the particular circumstances’. 
The same reasoning was used by the court in Ozinsky No v Lloyd and Others
97
 the court held 
that if a company continues to carry on business and to incur liabilities when, in the opinion 
of a reasonable businessman standing in the director’s shoes, there would be no reasonable 
prospect of the creditors receiving payment when due, it will in general be proper inference 
that the business is being carried recklessly. It is partly subjective ‘insofar as the defendant’s 
knowledge is taken to account’.
98
 In Strut Ahead Natal v Burns
99
 the court held that the 
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plaintiff is to prove on balance of probabilities that the defendant was knowingly a party to 
the carrying on of the business of the company recklessly, or with intent defraud creditors of 
the company. 
The test has been used by most of the court, and argued by writers, when dealing with the 
issue of recklessness. In M A Vleisagentskap CC & Another v Shaw Another
100
 Davis J in his 
judgment held: 
‘Whatever inference can legitimately be drawn from the evidence, the test remains whether a reasonable 
business person standing in the shoes of the defendant would run a business for a long time in circumstance 
where clearly there had been cash flow problems which in fact he had continued to communicate to his 
directors’. 
This court did not make it clear of whether a reasonable man would only look at whether the 
business of the company would run for a long time. The issue which remained was what 
would happen if the business of the company looked as if it would run for a long time but 
suddenly drops down thereby becoming being wound up. In that instance would that mean 
the business of the company was not carried in a reckless manner? As a result the court in 
Ebrahim and Another v Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd
101
 interpreted the recklessness test in a 
more vivid manner. Cameron JA
102
 endorsed that acting recklessly consists in ‘consideration 
to the consequences of one’s actions, in other words, an attitude of reckless disregard of such 
consequences’. For example, ‘a director who, despite remaining on board, fails to attend 
board meetings or to acquaint himself with the company’s affairs may be arguably be said to 
be evincing a lack of genuine concern for prosperity of the business of the company, thus 
personally placing himself in an enormous position should the business of the company ever 
                                                                                                                                                        
99
 Op cit note 70. The facts of the case provided that at all times the defendant had denied that he was the 
director of the company. Defendant had denied that he was the sole director of the company. However, the 
evidence showed that at all times he was the one with authority to allow any transactions by the company. At 
all times third parties thought they were dealing with the defendant. Accordingly, he could not escape liability 
under s424 (1) of the Companies Act. 
100
 2003 (6) SA 714 (C) at page 722. 
101
 Op cit note 17 at para 14. Cameron J held: ‘Acting “recklessly” consists in an entire failure to give 
consideration to the consequences of one's actions, in other words, an attitude of reckless disregard of such 
consequences'. In applying the recklessness test to the running of a closed corporation, the court should have 
regard to amongst other things the corporation's scope of operations, the members' roles, functions and 
powers, the amount of the debts,  the extent of the financial difficulties and the prospects of recovery, plus 
the particular circumstances of the claim 'and the extent to which the [member] has departed from the 
standards of a reasonable man in regard thereto’.  This test was also used in S v Dhlamini 1988 (2) SA 302 (A). 
See also M Havenga  ‘Director’s Personal Liability for Reckless Trading’ (1998) 61 (4) Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse 





fail and an enquiry is instituted in terms of s424 (1)’.
103
 In applying the recklessness test to 
the running of a close corporation the court should have regard to amongst other things the 
corporation’s scope of operations, the members’ roles, functions and powers, the amount of 
the debts, the extent of the financial difficulties and the prospects of recovery.
104
 In this 
instance it is clear that where a director of the company enters to a contract, and then causes 
the company to be wound up while fully aware that the creditor will not receive any dividend 
from the insolvent estate of the company, is thus guilty of the reckless conduct of the affairs 
of the company, as intended in s 424(1) of the Companies Act. In McLuckie v Sullivan
105
 the 
company’s balance sheet reflected, after tax, a loss on the company’s business. It was 
common cause that the company would have been wound up prior to the agreements between 
the defendant and the plaintiff. The defendant had failed before to carry the work due to the 
plaintiff. The defendant knew that the company had experienced financial difficulties and 
was hopelessly insolvent but nevertheless continued to take money from the plaintiff without 
any work being done. The court held that allowing the company to take moneys paid in terms 
of agreement well knowing that there is no possibility that the company can pay back 
amounts to reckless trading. Blieden J in his judgment held: 
‘The company Dansk could only perform its obligations to the plaintiff with the financial support of the 
defendant. The defendant's statement that Dansk would not comply with its written undertaking constitutes 
repudiation by the company of its agreed obligations to the plaintiff. By allowing Dansk to keep the moneys 
paid in terms of the  I agreement, well knowing that there was no possibility that Dansk could pay it back to 
the plaintiff, unless he paid it, the defendant caused it to act recklessly, as envisaged in s 424 of the Act, and as 
submitted by counsel for the plaintiff’.
106
 
Blieden J further held: 
‘This case is a classic example of a party who owns all the shares and is in control of a company attempting to 
use its formal identity to avoid it paying a debt due by it to a creditor, where he on behalf of that company 
caused it to incur that debt at a time he knew it could not pay it without his financial assistance. Section 424 of 
the Act was passed to avoid the injustice of such conduct’
107
. 
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Furthermore, in Strut Ahead Natal v Burns
108
 the court held that carrying on of a company 
recklessly means to carry on business through actions which show lack of any genuine 
concern of prosperity. In this instance it may be said that the test for recklessness requires 
that directors should act in a way that a reasonable man would have acted in the same 
circumstances. If a director does not act in a manner that a reasonable man would have, such 
director is carrying the business of the company recklessly. After all if director fails to take 
reasonable steps in conducting the business of the company thereby acting recklessly, he may 
be liable under s424 (1) for failing to take positive steps. This is the case even if the director 
was lazy to take reasonable steps that a reasonable person would have taken.
109
  
The recklessness requirement was further formulated by the court in Raflatac SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Bell and Another
110
 where the court held that ‘the conduct of the defendant must be weighed 
when considering whether they entirely failed to give consideration to the consequences of 
their actions and adopted ‘an attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences’. One may 
conclude that from the wording of the Act, it is clear that negligence on its own does not 
amount to recklessness but there must be a gross negligence. Arguably gross negligence, 
judging from this judgment, means that a person knows about negligence of his conduct but 
nevertheless continues with his conduct thereby causing more negligence than the original 
negligence he knew about. What is only required is the fact that the director knew of the 
conduct of recklessness while carrying the business of the company in that manner
111
.  
Another important note to be considered is that when the courts refer to a reasonable man, it 
is not just any other reasonable man. It is not enough to just conclude that a reasonable man 
would have acted differently, or in the same conduct, on the relevant circumstance. It is not 
enough to take any reasonable man and apply the test in the relevant circumstances. A 
reasonable man should have the knowledge of the relevant background circumstances or the 
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type of field in which the issue is based on. In Fourie NO & Another v Newton
112
 Cloete J 
held: 
‘In evaluating the conduct of the directors, courts should not be astute to stigmatise decisions made by 
businessman as reckless simple because perceived entrepreneurial options did not pan out. What is required is 
not the application of the exact science of handsight, but a value judgment bearing in mind what was known, 
or ought reasonably to have been known, by individual director at the time the decisions were made. In 
making that value judgment, courts can usefully be guided by the opinions of businessmen who move in the 
world of commerce and who are called upon to make these decisions in the performance of their functions as 
directors of companies, and by experts who advise businessmen in the making of such decisions or who 
evaluate them at the time they are made’.  
Based on this argument, it may be said that the reasonable man is a person with a sound 
knowledge of the relevant field of practice in question. A reasonable man is a person who 
may have experienced or has a detailed knowledge of the conduct that should be taken in the 
circumstances.  
However, the court went too far in concluding that experts are relevant in the circumstances. 
This is because it is likely to find that a person who is conducting the business of the 
company is still new in the field of conducting the business of the company. If we accept that 
his conduct must be the same as that of an expert, this may cause injustice as such person 
may not be aware of what an expert knows. Our company law does not preclude person who 
are not expert to start their own companies. Anyone can start his/her own company as long as 
it is registered. Therefore, when deciding the cases of recklessness, the court should have the 
mentality that some people are not expert in the handling of the business of the company. 
Accordingly, it is unfair to compare such persons to the mind of an expert as their minds are 
not the same and the way they think is not the same. It is enough to hold them liable on the 
reasonable man test with the knowledge of conducting the business of the company but not 
an expert. The reason is the fact that the higher the expert knows about the conducting of 
business the easier it is for ordinary person, with companies, to be found liable using the 
reasonable man test. After all, one may argue that in order to be successful, the applicant is to 
adduce evidence that a reasonable court can conclude ‘that when credit was incurred by a 
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company, while the defendant was running the business of the company, there was evidence 
that such credit would not be paid’.
113
 
4.3. Intent to defraud or fraudulent purpose 
The provision of s424 (1) imposes liability to anyone who had intention to defraud creditors, 
and such intention may be express or actual.
114
 In considering whether the business of the 
company has been carried on fraudulently, one is to look at the evidence in question. As per 
Strut Ahead Natal v Burns
115
 plaintiff is to prove on balance of probabilities that the 
defendant was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business of the company with 
intent defraud creditors of the company. This principle was also used by the court in 
Terblanche No & Others v Damji & Another 
116
 where the court held that the issue of 
whether the business was carried on with intent to defraud creditors or for fraudulent purpose 
involves a subjective enquiry as to the respondent’s intention in carrying on the business in 
the manner alleged. Fraud in its sense may be defined as ‘an unlawful and intentional making 
of a misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to 
another’.
117
 The wrongdoer must be aware that the representation will be prejudicial to 
another party. In this instance the wrongdoer must have no honest belief that the 
representation is true.
118
 In respect of the intention to defraud creditors of the company, the 
relevance is where a company continues to carry on with incurring debts, even though it is to 
the knowledge of directors that there is no reasonable prospect that creditors will receive their 
payment, then such inference is that the business of the company was carried with intent to 
defraud
119
. In this instance dolus eventualis is sufficient as Knoll J in Terblanche No & 
Others v Damji & Another
120
 held the following: 
‘In my view, applicants have proved on a balance of probabilities that the first respondent committed fraud in 
November 1999 by altering the amount payable on a cheque made out to the company. She was the 
perpetrator of the transaction. All the elements of fraud are present. In so doing, she dishonestly inflated the 
                                                 
113
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assets of the company. The most probable inference to be drawn is that in so acting she was carrying out the 
business of the company. Such business was carried out with a fraudulent purpose’. 
In Heneways Freight Services v Grogor
121
 the court held that fraud is only committed if the 
wrongdoer had no reason to believe, at the time when the debt in question was incurred, that 
the funds would become available to pay the debt when due. In this case the respondent was 
found not to have acted with intent to defraud creditors by issuing cheques which were 
stopped or dishonoured almost immediately after the due dates appearing on the cheques, in 
order to overcome liquidity difficulties of the company. In reaching the decision Zulman JA 
held: 
‘One needs to bear in mind that the majority of the 700 cheques issued by the company during the relevant 
period were met. The reality of the matter was that the company was experiencing cash-flow problems during 
the year in question. The respondent was aware of this and in order to keep the business of the company 
going he delayed, and I would add, made arrangements, with some of the company's creditors, in order to pay 
more pressing debts by buying time, as it were’
122
. 
The court further held the following: 
‘As already pointed out, of the approximately 700 cheques issued, the number of cheques stopped was not 
considerable in number or amount and was approximately only about 8% of the total number of cheques 
issued. Indeed it is apparent that approximately 650 out of 700 cheques were paid on the due date thereof 
and that, of those that were countermanded, all but the cheque handed to the appellant were met shortly 
after the due date of the cheque… In my view, the Court a quo was correct on the basis of the undisputed 
evidence that I have mentioned above, in finding that the respondent had not acted with fraudulent intent’.
123 
Clearly the court’s reasoning in this case was about the fact that ‘where a debtor, knowing  or 
having good grounds to suspect that he does not have and will not have sufficient asset to pay 
all his creditors in full, pays some but not others, or pays them in unequal portion, with the 
consequence that some creditor either is not paid at all or is paid a lesser proportion for his 
debt than others, this does not per se amount to carrying on business with intent to defraud 
creditors or for any fraudulent purpose’.
124
 If the acts, in the carrying of the business of the 
company, were merely incidental to the dominant activity, such acts are not to be said to have 
been fraudulent. However, if those acts are not merely incidental but they played dominant 
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activity in an integral part, then they may, arguably, be said to connote fraudulent purpose.
125
 
The evaluation which can be drawn from these cases is the fact that fraudulent purpose or 
intention to defraud creditors is proved by an inference that is drawn and consistent with the 
facts of each case. If it cannot be shown that the respondent is aware of the fraud being 
perpetrated, then it may be difficult to impose liability. For a defendant to be liable, applicant 
is to show that the defendant had no honest belief that the debt would be paid at the time the 
debt was contracted.
126
 Intention to defraud ‘entails more than just foresight of the harm 
which may result from engaging in the conduct in question, but it requires actual dishonesty 




Furthermore, fraud may also be committed where one party has a duty to disclose facts. In 
other words, non-disclosure of facts may amount to fraud. However, in order to be able to 
claim under s424 (1) one is to prove that facts were material.
128
 In Hemphill & Another v 
Shone NO & Others
129
 plaintiff learnt about the company’s liquidation. He asked the first 
defendant, and the defendant denied that the company was in liquidation. The third defendant 
led the plaintiff to believe that the property it had purchased was available knowing that it 
was not available. The court held that the defendants could not escape liability under s424 (1) 
as they misled the plaintiff and allowed the company to contract while its business was 
unsound. Accordingly, they did so fraudulent with the intent to defraud plaintiff.
130
 
Having said that the defendant may be liable for reckless and fraudulent trading under s424 
(1), such defendant may also escape liability in certain circumstances. The defendant may 
escape liability if the inference drawn from the facts shows that carrying on of the business of 
the company was consistent with honest belief or intention.
131
 In Raflatac case
132
 the court 
held that ‘the conduct of the defendant must be weighed when considering whether they 
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entirely failed to give consideration to the consequences of their actions and adopted “an 
attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences. The court used the word “entirely” to 
decide whether the defendants were recklessly. If we look at the meaning of the expression 
“gross negligence, as used in the Act, it can be concluded that the word “entirely” confirms 
that one has to fail entirely in order to conclude that there was gross negligence which results 
to recklessness. This is an existing law because if one is to look previous cases the courts 
were of the same view with the fact that one is to grossly negligence to be liable under s424 
(1).
133
 If the debtor makes an effort to prevent prejudice against the creditor, while 





4.4. Any person who is knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business of the 
company in the aforesaid manner 
4.4.1. Any person 
The phrase “any person” is wide enough to include natural person and juristic person. Section 
19 (1) (b)
135
 provides that from the time the incorporation of a company is registered, the 
company has all the legal powers and capacity of an individual to enter into contracts. 
Arguably, if the corporation acts in capacity of being a person, it does not act as the 
corporation but it is acting as person
136
. As a result s424 (1) may apply against the 
company
137
. It may be, arguably, said that this is the reason why the new Companies Act
138
 
was enacted so as to enable the company to act against its directors where they have conduct 
the business of the company. The new Companies Act was not enacted to abolish s424 (1) as 
the provisions of s424 (1) and the provisions of the new Act do not focus on the same person. 
Section 424 (1) focuses on persons such as creditors in which it includes natural persons. On 
the other hand s22 and s77 of the new Companies Act focuses on the company as juristic 
person which may claim against its directors. Accordingly, despite the coming into force of 
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the Companies Act of 2008, s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 61 of 1973 continues to apply 
as both sections focus on different persons. It may be said that both the 1973 Act and the 
2008 Act are mechanisms of the penalty which may be imposed against directors for 
fraudulent and reckless trading. In enacting the new Act, Legislature did not intend to abolish 





 of the Act imposes penalties to anyone who knowingly and acted recklessly 
in running a company. Section 424 (1) of the 1973 Companies Act provides that 
“knowledge” or “knowingly” ‘means the knowledge of the facts from which the conclusion 
may properly be drawn that the business of the company was or is being fraudulently or 
recklessly conducted’.
140
 In Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others
141
 Howie JA 
concluded the word “knowingly” as the following: 
‘Knowingly means having knowledge of the facts from which the conclusion is properly drawn that the 
business of the company was or is being carried on recklessly; it does not entail knowledge of the legal 
consequence of those facts’. 
The conclusion which can be drawn here is the fact that, in terms of s424 (1), it is not 
necessary to prove that a person had actual knowledge of the legal consequences of facts.  
However, there has been a change in the interpretation of the word “knowingly” between the 
Companies Act of 1973 and Companies Act of 2008. It is indeed true that s424 (1) of the 
Companies Act of 1973 and s77 (3) of the Companies Act of 2008 render liable any person 
who was knowingly a party to the carrying on the business of the company recklessly or 
fraudulently, but both Acts are different in the interpretation of the word “knowingly”. As it 
has been said above, s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 does not require that a person 
must have actual knowledge of the consequences. On the other hand, s1 of the Companies 
Act of 2008 provides that person must have actual knowledge of the matter.
142
 As a result, 
                                                 
139
 Op cit note 19. 
140
 Cassim Op cit note 3 at 589. 
141
 Op cit note 17 at page 142. 
142
 Op cit note 12. Section 1 provides that ‘knowingly, when used with respect to a person, and in relation to a 
particular matter, means that the person either had actual knowledge of the matter; or was in position in 
which the person reasonably ought to have had actual knowledge; investigated the matter to an extent that 
would have provided the person with actual knowledge; or taken other measures which, if taken, would 
reasonably expected to have provided the person with actual knowledge of the matter’.   
30 
 
under a new Companies act ‘a person who could have acquired knowledge by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence will fall within the scope of s77 (3) (b) and s 214 (1) (c)’.
143
  
Even though the new Companies Act has come into force, the current position remains with 
s424 (1) when creditors are applying in court for liability of directors for reckless and 
fraudulent trading. The reason for this is the fact that our courts have used s424 (1), as to the 
word knowingly, in recent case.
144
 The situation is different as to the causal link in respect of 
the insolvency of the company.
145
 One may argue that both Acts render any person who was 
knowingly a party to the aforementioned conduct. Therefore, it is important to deal with the 
meaning of the phrase “party to” as contemplated by Acts. 
4.4.3. Party to 
The phrase “party to” is wide enough to cover a third party who participated in the carrying 
on the business of the company recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors. Section 424 (1) 
requires that the person must have been party to the carrying on of the business of the 
company in the aforesaid manner. In this instance s424 (1) is the same as s77 (3) and s22 (1) 
of the Companies Act of 2008
146
 as they both require that for a person to be liable, he must 
have been party to the carrying on of business recklessly or fraudulently. It is important to 
note that a party to the carrying on of the business of the company reckless or fraudulent must 
have had been associated with the common pursuit as everybody else who is liable, and need 
not to have taken positive steps. In Powertech Industries Ltd v Mayberry & Another
147
 
Nugent J defined “party to” as the following: 
‘To be a “party” to the conduct of a company's business requires an association with it in a common pursuit. 
That is the ordinary meaning of the word as it is used in the statute. The meaning given to that sense of the 
word by The Oxford English Dictionary is 'one who takes part, participates, or is concerned in some action or 
affair; a participator; an accessory', conveying the idea of a person who associates with the company not in 
pursuit of his own ends, but in pursuit of those of the company. A “party” to the carrying on of a company's 
business is one who has joined with the company in a common pursuit. Generally this would include its 
directors and managers, all of whom are acting in common pursuit of the company's business’. 
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In Philotex (Pty) Ltd & Others v Snyman & Others
148
 the court held that being party to the 
carrying on of the business of the company recklessly or fraudulently does not have to 
involve the taking of positive steps, but it is enough to support or concur in the conduct of the 
business.  In Triptomania Twee (Pty) Ltd & Others v Connolly & Another
149
 the court held 
that the wording of s424 (1) involves that the party must have taken part or concurred in such 
business practice. Therefore, it may be, arguably, said that the phrase “party to” includes that 
a party to the carrying on of the company’s business is the one who has joined with the 
company in the common pursuit as the existing parties of the company.
150
 As a result, ‘a 
company director, though, because of his duties of utmost good faith towards the company 
and of exercising reasonable skill and diligence, might be liable as a party under s424 (1) for 
failing to take positive steps in the carrying on of the business correctly and his laziness could 
even constitute agreement with that conduct’
151
. What is only needed is that the defendant is 
intimately involved in the company’s business. In Firstrand Bank v Fourie & Another
152
 the 
learned judge held signature of financial statements by the auditor and/or the director of the 
company and/or the accountant who prepared the financial statements is a clear indication 
they are not just working documents but are documents which to be used by a creditor. As a 
result, defendant was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business of the company 




4.4.4. Debts and Other Liabilities 
Section 424 (1) requires that the company must have debts and other liabilities. In this 
instance, once the creditor has suffered debts or any other liability, such creditor may then 
use s424 (1) to claim against any party who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the 
company’s business in the aforesaid manner. On the other hand, 77 (3) of the new Companies 
Act allows the company, in the same instances, to claim against any person who conducted 
the business of the company in the aforesaid manner. The situation is different where there 
was extinguishing of debts. Where debts of the company have been extinguished by the 
                                                 
148
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creditors of the company through their agreement, s424 (1) will not be applicable and may 
not be invoked to render directors personally liable for non-existing debts
154
. In Ex Parte De 
Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Development (Pty) Ltd
155
 Stegman J held: 
‘What is aimed at by an application in terms of s424 (1) is that a person contemplated by the subsection (often a 
director or officer of an insolvent company and whom I shall call a wrongdoing company representative) should 
be declared personally responsible for… For s424 (1) to be operative at all, the company must have debts and 
other liabilities. If the company has no debts or liabilities, an essential requirement is missing and s424 (1) 
cannot provide a remedy… It seems to me obvious that s424 (1) cannot possibly function after the extinction of 
such debts and liabilities by the agreement of the creditors and sanction of the court’. 
This court’s view can be said to be in line with the fact that the company’s insolvency is a 
going concern. In this instance, at the winding up of the company, creditors may agree that 
debts are to be extinguished. It is important to emphasize that the application of s424 (1) is 
executable at the winding up of the company. The problem arises as to the interpretation of 
the new Company’s Act. The new Companies Act does not wait for the company to be 
wound before it applies. As a result the problem may be in the situation whereby the creditors 
agree to extinguish debts but at a later stage the company continues to accrue other debts. If 
that is the case, then the question would be whether the company was carried on recklessly or 
fraudulently at the first instance or at the time after creditors have agreed to extinguish debts. 
The courts have not yet faced such situation, and the position may be, arguably, be said that 




The issue of insolvency is a concern in the Companies Act of 2008. Section 22 (1) (b) of the 
2008 Act adds another prohibited business trading known trading under insolvent 
circumstances. This section prohibits directors to trade on insolvent circumstances
157
. In this 
instance it may said that the new Companies Act specifically prohibits the trading of the 
company under insolvent status. Section 22(2), as Cassim argues, ‘is aimed at deterring 
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companies from trading or carrying on business while commercially insolvent’
158
. In this 
sense, the directors of the company are prohibited from incurring debts and liabilities of the 
company irresponsible while the company is nearly insolvent
159
.   Insolvency in respect of 
s22 (1) (b) has two folds namely factual insolvency and commercial insolvency. The question 
is how to do decide whether the company is commercially insolvent or factually insolvent. 
The splitting of insolvency in this manner has been dealt with by academics and courts. 
Cassim
160
 says that factual insolvency is the one where company’s liabilities exceed its assets 
while commercial insolvency ‘relates to liquidity or the company’s ability to pay its debts as 
they become due in the ordinary course of business’. In Exparte De Villiers NNO: In re 
Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd
161
 the court approved that the test for a company’s 
insolvency is not whether company’s liabilities exceed its assets, but whether it is able to pay 
its debts. However, it may be argued that the court in this was referring to the commercially 
insolvency as Cassim
162
 argues that factual insolvency does require that for a company to be 
factually insolvent its liabilities must exceed its assets. In respect of factual insolvency it may 
then be, arguably, said that s424 (1) plays essential part because factual insolvency may 
clearly arise at the winding up of the company. In the recent case of Absa Bank Ltd v Erf 
1252 Marine Drive (Pty) Ltd & Another
163
 the court held that actual insolvency is a powerful 
indicator that the company is unable to pay its debts and evidence of failure of the company 
to pay, on demand, its debts when due, is a prima facie proof that the company is factually 
insolvent. Accordingly, it is not an issue to prove factually insolvency and the application of 
s424 (1) of the Companies Act. Issue arises as to commercially insolvency as contemplated 
by new Companies Act. 
Even though the test of insolvency is so important and crucial but our courts have had 
different opinions as to the interpretation of it. In the recent case of Nedbank Ltd v Zonnekus 
Mansions (Pty) Ltd
164
 the court held that commercially insolvency pertains to illiquidity and 
encompasses two elements namely available funds and readily realisable assets. This was the 
confirmation of the reasoning of the court in Absa Bank Ltd v Erf 1252 Marine Drive (Pty) 
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 where the court held that it is not necessary that for the applicant, who 
proceeds for winding up of the company, to show that the company is actually insolvent, but 
the applicant is to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its 
debts. In this case the court was using the interpretation of the 1973 Companies Act rather 
than the 2008 Companies Act. However, it may not be said that the court should have used 
the 2008 Companies Act simple because of the fact that the 2008 companies Act focuses on 
the claim by the company. Therefore, even if the courts are using the 2008 Companies Act in 
relation to insolvency, they will refer back to 1973 Companies Act because it is the one 
which focuses on creditors of the company. Accordingly, it is relevant to use the decisions 
which have been decided before the enactment of the Companies Act of 2008 when one is 
dealing with the claim by creditors. 
It is indeed true that insolvency has been so crucial in our courts, but they have had different 
opinions as to the interpretation of it in relation to the risk which is imposed to the creditors. 
The courts have concluded differently as to whether the imposing of risk to the creditors 
amounts to reckless or fraudulent trading. In Nel & Others NNO v McArthur & Others
166
 the 
court held that as long as the conduct in question involves a risk that will not receive their 
payment, it can be regarded as reckless trading. However, in Heneways Freight Services v 
Grogor
167
 the court held that the mere fact that defendant puts the creditors at risk does not 
mean that he acted negligently. When the company is technically solvent, the enquiry 
remains as to whether the directors genuinely believe that the company will be able to pay its 
debt
168
. The court which has articulated this in a logical detail is the case of Fourie NO & 
Another v Newton
169
 where Cloete J held: 
‘A question whether the company is unable to pay its debts when they fall due is always a question of fact to 
be decided as a matter of commercially reality in the light of all the circumstances of the case, and not merely 
by looking at the accountants and making mechanical comparison of assets and liabilities. The situation must 
be viewed as it would be by someone operating in a practical business environment. This requires a 
consideration of the company’s financial condition in its entirety, including the nature and the circumstances 
of its activities, its assets and liabilities and the nature of them; cash on hand, monies procurable within a 
relatively short time, relative that is to the nature and demand of the debts and to the circumstances of the 
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 Op cit note 112 at para 30. 
35 
 
company including the nature of its business, by the sale of assets, or by way of loan mortgage or pledge of 
asset, or by raising capital’. 
The court clearly tried to overcome the situation of disagreements as to the risk that can be 
imposed to the creditors by the debtor. Here, it may be argued that it does not matter to look 
at the risk, but one must look at practical business environment. In this sense, factors such as 
the liabilities of the company; the financial condition of the company; and whether money 
can be recoverable when due to creditors. In this sense the court may look at whether the 
debtor has failed entirely to communicate with the creditor as to its financial position and the 
raising of monies to the company
170
. If this is the case, it may be argued that the company 
was trading under insolvent circumstance which is prohibited by the Companies Act.  
Furthermore, the reasoning of the court requires that the scrutiny of company’s business must 
have been insolvent as opposed to the mere comparison of assets and liabilities of the 
company. The assets and liabilities must be compared to the conduct of someone who is the 
same business as the debtor. In that sense it may be, arguably, said that the reasonableness id 
applied in circumstances where there is argument that the business of the company was 
conducted under insolvent status of the business. 
 
5. A critique of both s424 (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 and s22 and s77 (3) of 
the Companies Act of 2008 
The purpose of s424 (1) is a good remedy and has been applied by the courts. Courts are 
prepared to use this section as a remedy available for creditors. This section protects creditor 
as it provides that where directors have carried the business of the company in a reckless or 
fraudulent manner, they are personally liable to the creditors. Despite the coming to force of 
the Companies Act of 2008, which has its own sections pertaining reckless and fraudulent 
trading, this section continues to apply. The section is clear as to who is creditor; when a 
person was reckless or fraudulent in trading; and when he was knowingly a party to the 
carrying of the business in the aforementioned conduct. This section is ‘not intended to create 
a joint and several liability between the company and those responsible for the reckless 
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conduct of its business, but rather to protect creditors against the prejudice they might suffer 
as a result of the business of the company being carried on in that way’
171
 However, the 
problem about this section, as opposed to the provision of s22 of the Companies Act of 2008, 
is that s424 (1) is aimed at the winding up of the company. In other words s424 (1) is only 
applicable at the time when the company is being wound up. In this instance, the court looks 
at the factual insolvency of the company. The issue about s424 (1) is around the issue of 
commercial insolvency. In recent case courts have used s424 (1) while dealing with 
commercial insolvency. On this circumstance, we should then ask ourselves whether the 
courts are trying to shape what is going to happen in future. 
 
The case which illustrate the idea that courts are trying to adopt the style of using the new 
Companies Act, while dealing with s424 (1) of the old Companies Act, is the case of Fourie v 
Firstrand Bank Ltd
172
. What happened in this in this case is that Firstrand instituted an action 
against Fourie, under s424 (1), for payment of debts owed by the company on the basis that 
Fourie and Du Preez were severally and jointly liable. This case is important as it makes 
directors aware for the personal liability for damages in terms of section 77 and section 22 of 
the Companies Act 2008 even though the case was dealing with s424 (1) of companies act of 
1973. According to Brand JA a causal link needs to be proved where a company is able to 
pay its debts, but if the company is hopelessly insolvent no causal link needs to be proved
173
. 
If this reasoning is interpreted correctly, it may be, arguably, said that the court was referring 
to commercial insolvency when it concluded that causal link is to be proved if the company is 
able to pay its debts. The reason for this is the fact that if the company is hopelessly insolvent 
it may be indeed wound up immediately. As a result s424 (1) is applicable without hesitation.  
 
However, as to commercially insolvency of the company s22 (2) applies as it prohibits the 
conducting of the company if company is unable to pay its debts as they become due. In this 
instance, the company need not to reach the stage where it is wound up before it is prohibited 
to trade under insolvent circumstances, but even if it is still trading it may be prohibited from 
continuing to do so unless it shown that it may be able to continue trading. On these 
argument, one may draw an inference that when courts are dealing with the company under 
s424 (1) they do visit the provision of s22 (2) because they ask whether the company was 
                                                 
171
 Subramanien Op cit note 15 at page 181  
172





unable to pay its debts, when they are due, if they want to see that the directors were reckless 
or fraudulent in conducting the business of the company.  
 
In recent cases the courts are looking at the time to decide whether the directors were 
conducting the business of the company recklessly or fraudulently
174
. In this instance it may 
be said that time refers to whether the company was trading under commercial insolvency as 
this will be relevant in deciding whether the directors are liable. The reason for this is the fact 
that time may not be an issue if s424 (1) is applied at the winding up of the company because 
that will be the relevant time which is self-evidentiary that the company is insolvent and that 
is why it is wound up. The time referred to in Cheng-Li Tsung case is the time which may be, 
arguably, said to refer to commercially insolvency of the company. However, even in this 
case of Cheng-Li Tsung the court was dealing with s424 (1) but introduced this reasoning of 
time and its necessity in deciding whether the directors are liable under s424 (1). In Fourie 
case the court looked at the fact that Fourie had contended that the company was financially 
sound, whereas Pienaar testified that, if he knew that the financial statements provided by 
Supreme Car misrepresented its financial position in that its business was in fact not 
profitable nor financially sound, he would not have recommended an increase in the floor-
plan credit facility as and when he did. Arguably, it can be said that the court looked at the 
commercial insolvency of the company as it took these arguments and held that Fourie was 
personally liable for the debts of the company. As for the present date, the position of time 
necessity is relevant as creditor will be required to prove a causal link whether the company 
is able to pay its debts if the creditor is applying under s424 (1). Even though s424 (1) does 
not deal with commercial insolvency, seemingly our courts are prepared to question the 
existence of commercially insolvency when dealing with s424 (1). 
 
Furthermore, the case of Fourie introduces the fact that directors may also be liable for 
damages even when s424 (1) was used to decide whether directors were liable for reckless 
and fraudulent trading.  In his judgment Brand JA used “But for” test to decide that Fourie 
was personally liable. In reaching decision Brand JA held the following: 
‘The 'but for' or causa sine qua non test, which is the accepted yardstick for determining factual causation, 
requires a hypothetical enquiry as to what probably would have happened, but for the wrongful conduct of 
the defendant…In my view, but for this series of misrepresentations, the total facility of R13 million would not 
have been granted. Thus understood, Supreme Car's indebtedness at the time of the termination of the floor 
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plan agreement was directly caused by Fourie's misrepresentations…In this light I do not agree with the court a 
quo's finding that the delictual element of factual causation had not been established by FirstRand. This leads 
me to three further conclusions: Firstly, Fourie is liable, not only in terms of s 424, but also in delict for the 
agreed amount of damages claimed by FirstRand; and secondly, the second respondent, as executor in the 
deceased estate of Du Preez, is also liable, jointly and severally with Fourie, for these damages; Thirdly, the 




When one is reading this judgment closely, it can be, arguably, said that s77 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 is introduced. Section 424 does not deal with damages as a remedy, 
only the new Companies act has introduced this type of remedy. Therefore, it can be said that 
this case is introducing the interpretation of s424 (1) using the provision of s77 of the new 
Companies Act. Accordingly, the court is trying to shape what may happen in future. The 
reasoning of the court is essential here because even though s424 (1) is still existing, but it 
does not include the provisions contained in the new Companies Act of 2008. Furthermore, 
the submission is that there is a logic here s424 (1) and s22 and 77 of the Companies Act deal 
with different kinds of people. It is going to be easy for creditors under s424 (1) to claim for 
damages using s424 (1) since it is the section which protects creditors. It seems s424 (1) is 
going to be interpreted beyond its specific provisions. However, this does not mean that it is 
going to be abolished because it is the core remedy to the creditors since the new Companies 
Act is focusing on the remedies to be provided to the company itself. It is indeed true that 
both the Companies Act of 1973 and 2008 have the similar meaning as to the prohibition of 
reckless and fraudulent trading, but they do apply to remedy similar persons. Accordingly, if 
s424 (1) is going to be abolished, that may create problem since creditors will not have 





This dissertation has looked at the liability of directors where a company engages in a 
fraudulent or reckless trading. The conclusion which can be drawn from this research paper is 
that the directors of the company must be aware of their conduct and should ensure that they 
conduct the affairs of the company in an honest and lawful manner. Section 424 (1) and s22 
read with s77 are there to impose personal liability on all directors who carry on the business 
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of the company recklessly, or fraudulently, or with intent to defraud creditors of the 
company. These sections provide useful remedies particularly to the creditors of the company 
and the company itself. Section 424 is a useful provision which protects creditors from any 
reckless or fraudulent trading by the directors of the company. On the other hand, s22 and s77 
(3) (b) are useful provisions as they provide for protection of the company from any reckless 
and fraudulent trading by the directors of the company. 
 
Courts are using s424 (1) to benefit the creditors at the winding up of the company where the 
Commission uses s22 to determine whether or not the company is trading under insolvent 
circumstances. Furthermore, the courts are applying s 424 in line with s77 read with s22 of 
the new Companies Act to find the relevant provision that may benefit the company or 
creditors of the company. Accordingly, the position makes it clear that the directors should be 
aware of liability that may arise against them when they conduct the business of the company 
recklessly or fraudulently. As a result directors, while trading in the course and scope of the 
company’s business, should be aware of the provisions of the s424 (1) and s22 and s77 (3) (b) 
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